Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

1976

Sales Law and Inflations
Alan Schwartz
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Economic Policy Commons, and the Finance Commons

Recommended Citation
Schwartz, Alan, "Sales Law and Inflations" (1976). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 2245.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2245

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

SALES LAW AND INFLATIONS*
ALAN SCHWARTZ**

The defendants, naturally, don't want to sell cotton because
the price has gone up and if I were one of those defendants I would
feel the same way. I would be sick as an old hound dog who ate a
rotten skunk, but unfortunately-well, not unfortunately-fortunately we all abide by contracts and that (is) the foundation on
which all of the business that you [the jury] have heard about here
today is done.t
Inflation is defined as "a sustained rise in the general price level."' It is the
product of federal fiscal or monetary policy. 2 Radical changes in relative
prices also occur, without changes in the general price level, because of
unexpected shortages or gluts. Although both phenomena are discussed, the
term "'inflation" will be used to denote large price rises caused by
government action.
This Article initially set out to consider how unanticipated causes of
price rises, of which inflation is a paradigm example, affected the
enforceability of sales contracts. In fact, these causes traditionally have had
no effect on the enforceability of sales contracts; courts required defaulting
promisors to pay damages. Recent commentators, however, have argued
that to impose on sellers all costs attributable to unanticipated events is
unacceptably harsh.3 They are supported in this view by a comment to
*
A preliminary version of this Article was presented before the Commercial, Contract
and Related Consumer Law Section of the Association of American Law Schools, on
December 28, 1975. Professors Michael E. Levine and Edward A. Dauer made quite helpful
comments on prior drafts, as did my colleagues Joseph Brodley, Jon T. Hirschoff, and Morris
S. Arnold. The responsibility for any errors which remain is mine. Were it customary to
dedicate articles, this Article would be dedicated to Professor John P. Dawson, whose great
work on earlier inflations created the framework within which all further analysis must be done.
**
Professor of Law, Indiana University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of
Southern California Law Center, 1976-77. B.S. 1961, Bates College; LL.B. 1964, Yale
University.
t Jury charge of the Hon. Wilber D. Owens, Jr., in Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v.
Fulton Benson, Civ. Action 2902 (M.D. Ga. 1974), quoted in Bolin Farms v. American Cotton
Shippers Ass'n, 370 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (W.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1975).
1. W. PETERSON, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS MACRO 41 (1974).
2. Gordon, The Demand for and Supply of Inflation, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 807 (1975).
3. See Hawkland, The Energy Crisisand Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
79 CoMM. L.J. 75 (1974); Rosett, Contract Performance: Promises, Conditions and the
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section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code4 (Code), which suggests
that extraordinary, unforeseeable cost increases should excuse sellers.
Moreover, a few cases decided under the Code have excused sellers when
unanticipated events unexpectedly made performance more costly.5 The
question of the effect unanticipated events should have on the enforceability
of sales contracts is therefore open. It is also an important question because
the most important such cause is inflation, and this country apparently has
failed to achieve domestic price stability.
Section I of this Article briefly describes the cases. Section 11 analyzes
the themes that apparently underlie the commentators' distaste for enforcement, and develops the only appealing case for excuse. Section III,
however, shows that application of this case would require courts to make
extraordinarily difficult factual inquiries and to engage in complex
economic analysis. The confusions that inevitably arise when courts are
required to do more than they can would here render judicial outcomes so
uncertain as to impair contract stability. A concern to ensure contract
stability, Section I concludes, thus explains and justifies the courts'
decision to enforce. Section IV then argues that that decision is also
anti-inflationary. Finally, Section V shows that the Uniform Commercial
Code permits enforcement.
I. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PRICE RISES
RESULTING FROM UNANTICIPATED CAUSES
The cases apparently are in two classes: (1) seller breaches because a price
rise enables him to resell for much more than the contract price; (2) seller is
Obligation To Communicate, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1083 (1975); Schmitt & Wollschlager,

Section 2-615 "Commercial Impracticability": Making the Impracticable Practicable, 81
COMM. L.J. 9(1976). But see White, Impossibility,ImpracticabilityandSuperveningIllegality, in
BREACH OF CoNTRAcr IN A SHORTAGE ECONOMY 9 (PLI 1974); Hurst, Freedomof Contract in an
Unstable Economy: Judicial Allocation of ContractualRisks Under UCC Section 2-615, 54

N.C.L. REv. 545 (1975) (courts should not excuse except when "it would be truly
unconscionable to enforce").
Other commentators argue that the price term should be revised to reflect subsequent
unanticipated events. See Sommer, Commercial Impracticability-An Overview, 13 DUQUESNE L.
REv. 521 (1975); Note, UCC § 2-615: Sharp Inflationary Increases in Cost as Excuse from

Performance,50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 297 (1974); Comment, The Energy Crisis and Economic
Impossibility in Louisiana, 49 TUL. L. REV. 605 (1975). See also Baudouin, Theory of
Imprevision and Judicial Intervention to Change a Contract,in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW OF

OBLIGATONS 151 (J. Dainow ed. 1969); Smit, Frustrationof Contract:A ComparativeAttempt
at Consolidation,58 COLUm. L. REV. 287 (1958). This essentially is an argument for excuse, as
its proponents urge the undesirability of enforcing the contract and apparently seek the same
objectives by price fixing that others seek by nonenforcement. The textual discussion, which
treats only the alternatives of enforcement or excuse, is thus relevant to this suggestion. See note
52 infra.

4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 4 (all citations are to the 1972 Official
Text). See text accompanying notes 57-66 infra.

5.

See notes 7-12 and accompanying text infra.
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a dealer or manufacturer, who breaches because the price of his inputs has
risen such that his resale contract would be performed at a loss. As an
example of this, a dealer contracted to sell popcorn at $6.75 a hundred
weight, but breached when the price to him went to $8.50.6
Sellers always lose Class 1 cases 7 and traditionally have lost Class 2
cases. 8 Recent authority faintly suggests that the latter result may change. In
6.

See ABC Vending Corp. v. Zussman, 105 F. Supp. 950 (D. Mass. 1952) (the dealer

lost).
7. This category is illustrated by the recent cotton cases in which the price that dealers
paid to farmers usually approximated $.30 a pound, and the market went as high as $.80. E.g.,
R.N. Kelley Cotton Merchant, Inc. v. York, 494 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Cone Mills Corp. v.
A.G. Estes, Inc., 377 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Mitchell-Huntley Cotton Co. v. Waldrep,
377 F. Supp. 1215 (N.D. Ala. 1974); Bolin Farms v. American Cotton Shippers Ass'n, 370 F.
Supp. 1353 (W.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1975); Cone Mills Corp. v. Hurdle, 369
F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Miss. 1974); R.N. Kelley Cotton Merchant, Inc. v. Cox, 18 UCC REP. SERV.
950 (Ala. 1976); Harris v. Hine, 232 Ga. 183, 205 S.E.2d 847 (1974). But see Loeb & Co. v.
Schreiner, 294 Ala. 722, 321 So. 2d 199 (1975) (contract unenforceable because in violation of
statute of frauds); Cox v. Cox, 292 Ala. 106, 289 So. 2d 609 (1974) (contract unenforceable
because in violation of statute of frauds).
For illustrations of Class I cases in other markets, see Pacific Trading Co. v. Mouton Rice
Milling Co., 184 F.2d 141 (8th Cir. 1950); Brevard Tannin Co. v. J.F. Mosser Co., 288 F. 725
(4th Cir. 1923); Distillers Factors Corp. v. United Distillers Prods. Corp., 76 F. Supp. 48 (D.
Conn. 1947); Eskew v. California Fruit Exch., 203 Cal. 257, 263 P. 804 (1927); Meyer v.
Sullivan, 40 Cal. App. 723, 181 P. 847 (1919); Southern Scrap Material Co. v. Commercial Scrap
Material Co., 239 La. 958, 120 So. 2d 491 (1960); Davison Chem. Co. v. Baugh Chem. Co., 134
Md. 24, 106 A. 269 (1919); Ohio Grain Co. v. Swisshelm, 40 Ohio App. 2d 203,318 N.E.2d 428
(1973); Universal Coal Co. v. Old Ben Coal Corp., 32 Ohio App. 254, 167 N.E. 904 (1929);
Blaffer & Farish v. Gulf Pipe Line Co., 218 S.W. 89 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1919); Hess Bros. v.
Great N. Pail Co., 175 Wis. 465, 185 N.W. 542 (1921).
A possible exception is Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948), in which
the court refused specific enforcement of a contract to sell carrots when the price was $30 a ton,
and the market went to $90. The basis of the decision, however, was the unconscionable nature
of the nonprice terms; the court did not say that specific performance would have been denied
had such terms been more balanced. In West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 377 F. Supp.
154 (M.D. Ala. 1974), a cotton case, the court rejected an unconscionability defense based
primarily on the discrepancy between contract and market prices.
8. For cases involving dealers, see, e.g., Williams Grain Co. v. Leval & Co., 277 F.2d
213 (8th Cir. 1960); Wickham & Burton Coal Co. v. Minnesota Coal Co., 7 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.
1925); P.N. Gray & Co. v. Cavalliotis, 276 F. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1921); aff'd, 293 F. 1018 (2d Cir.
1923); Pilsen Coal Co. v. West Chicago Park Comm'rs, 221 Ill. App. 162 (1921); Ellis Gray
Milling Co. v. Sheppard, 359 Mo. 505, 222 S.W.2d 742 (1949); Wilson & Co. v. Freemont Cake
& Meal Co., 153 Neb. 160, 43 N.W.2d 657 (1950), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 812 (1951); Maple
Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 352 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Terry
Contracting v. Commercial Ins. Co., 16 Misc. 2d 475, 156 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Vanetta
Velvet Corp. v. Kakunaka & Co., 256 App. Div. 341, 10 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1939); International
Minerals & Metals Corp. v. Weinstein, 236 N.C. 558, 73 S.E.2d 472 (1952). Courts, of course, do
enforce exculpatory clauses. See, e.g., Roessler & Hasslacher Chem. Co. v. Standard Silk
Dyeing Co., 254 F. 777 (2d Cir. i918) (very broad force majeure clause, explicitly including
,.war," the excusing event); Thomson v. Thomson, 315 Ill. 521, 146 N.E. 451 (1925) (contract
made subject to rules of Chicago Board of Trade; the Board required the seller to breach).
For cases involving manufacturers and contractors, see, e.g., Farmers Fertilizer Co. v.
Lillie, 18 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1927); Itang & Gros Mfg. Co.'v. Fort Wayne Paper Co., 278 F. 483
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one case, 9 a dealer was allowed to breach a contract to sell propane gas
because the energy crisis had .made propane unexpectedly scarce. However,
the buyer failed to argue that the energy crisis was an impermissible ground
for excuse: the court merely assumed it was, the case turning on the fairness
of the seller's allocation of scarce gas among his customers.' 0 In another
case,11 a New York trial court denied the buyer's motion for a summary
judgment for specific performance of a contract to build a boat, holding that
if the seller's greatly increased costs were attributable to the energy crisis,
he would be excused. A federal district court also recently suggested that the
energy crisis might excuse an oil company from supplying gasoline to retail
stations, although the point apparently had not been argued. I2 While these
cases scarcely constitute a trend, they do suggest that the question whether
price rises resulting from unanticipated causes should excuse sellers is no
longer closed.
Before proceeding to the possible grounds for excusing sellers affected
by such causes, it should be noted that the above classification is merely
formal: the two case categories are actually one. Consider a Class 1 seller
where the contract price is $1.00 and the market goes to $1.50. His "cost of"
or "loss from" compliance is $.50, the sum he foregoes by performing. Now
take a Class 2 seller who contracts to resell goods he does not own, where the
cost of the goods to him would have been $.80 a unit had he bought when his
(7th Cir. 1921); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 19 UCC REP. SERV. 721 (S.D. Fla.
1975); Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 UCC REP. SERV. 989, 993 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Shedd-Bartuch Foods v. Commodity Credit Corp., 135 F. Supp. 78 (N.D. Ill. 1955),
aff'd, 231 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1956); Dwight v. Callaghan, 53 Cal. App. 132, 199 P. 838 (1921);
Freeto v. State Highway Comm'n, 161 Kan. 7, 166 P.2d 728 (1946); Kohlman v. Witherell &
Dobbins Co., 155 La. 57, 98 So. 756 (1924); Hein v. Fox, 126 Mont. 514, 254 P.2d 1076 (1953);
London & Lancashire Indem. Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 107 Ohio St. 51, 140 N.E. 672 (1923);
Schafer v. Sunset Packing Co., 256 Ore. 539, 474 P.2d 529 (1970); Gross v. Exeter Mach.
Works, Inc., 277 Pa. 363, 121 A. 195 (1923); Goldstein v. Old Dominion Peanut Corp., 177 Va.
716, 15 S.E.2d 103 (1941).
9. Mansfield Propane Gas Co. v. Folger Gas Co., 231 Ga. 868, 204 S.E.2d 625 (1974).
10. When the excusing event affects only part of the seller's ability to perform, he "must
allocate production and deliveries among his customers. . . in any manner which is fair and
reasonable." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615(b).
11. Gay v. Seafarer Fiberglass Yachts, Inc., 14 UCC REP. SERV. 1335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974).
12. Intermar, Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 364 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (dictum).
Sellers still try. The Anaconda Company recently sued Reynolds Metals Company for breach of
a contract to sell 360,000 tons of refined aluminum ore. Although the contract contained a price
escalation clause, Reynolds claimed that recent cost increases raised production well-above the
contract rate. See Louisville Courier Journal, July 8, 1975, § B, at 10, col. 5. Westinghouse
Electric Corporation also recently announced that it would renege on its contracts to sell
refined uranium because the price of raw uranium unexpectedly tripled, making production at
the contract rate "commercially impracticable." Wall Street Journal, Sept. 30,1976, at I, col. 6;
id. Sept. 9, 1975, at 5, col. 2. This action was severely criticized, in an editorial in Barron's, on
the ground that Westinghouse should have hedged against price rises as its competitors
allegedly did. See Sanctity of Contract?You Can't Be Sure If Its Westinghouse, in Barron's,
Sept. 15, 1975, at 7, col. 1. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1976, § 3, at 4, col. 5.
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resale contract was made and the resale price is $1.00. Inflation raises the
goods' cost to $1.05 and prices in the seller's market to $1.31. Again the loss
from compliance is the difference between the new market and contract
prices-here $.31. This is the sum the seller foregoes by performing, and out
of which he would be made whole for the increase in input cost. Courts now
occasionally treat Class 2 sellers more leniently, 13 apparently because an
increment of their performance cost is often a large out-of-pocket loss-the
$.05 in the above example. Consequently, Class 2 sellers make sympathetic
defendants. Because of the interest these sellers have aroused, and to simplify
a regrettably complex analysis, this Article will focus only on the Class 2
case, but the reader should take it that most of what is said, and the
conclusion, apply to Class 1 situations as well. 14
II.

THE CASES FOR EXCUSE

Two principal themes apparently underlie the commentators' imprecisely
stated argument that sellers seriously affected by unanticipated events
should be excused. The first focuses on the harshness of imposing large
costs on sellers. This theme, referred to as the "harshness case" for excuse,
presupposes that courts should redistribute the gains and losses that
unanticipated market-affecting events create. Section 11-A, however, shows
that courts are institutionally incompetent to do this. 15 The second theme
focuses on the seemingly "undeserved" character of the losses to sellers
and gains to buyers that unanticipated market-affecting events create. This
theme, referred to as the "desert case" for excuse, is compelling in its
theoretical form; but as Section I shows, the difficulties inherent in its use
13.

See text accompanying notes 7-12 supra.

14.

The distinction drawn in the text between Class 1 and Class 2 sellers, that only the

latter may suffer out-of-pocket losses, is not always correct. A Class I seller who buys at
preinflationary prices and is compelled to sell at the preinflationary contract price receives

dollars which inflation has devalued, and thus also incurs an out-of-pocket loss. Currency
depreciations in this century have been sufficiently mild as to yield no cases in which sellers
have shown significant harm from dollar devaluations. The current prevalence of long-term
contracts, coupled with the present inflation rate, may yet produce such cases. Performance
even then probably would not be excused unless the depreciation were quite extraordinary. See
Brubrad Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 404 F. Supp. 691 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Dawson & Cooper,
The Effect of Inflation on Private Contracts: United States, 1861-1879, 33 MiCH. L. REV. 852

(1935); cf. Nussbaum, Debts UnderInflation,86 U. PA. L. REv. 571 (1938). Judicial reluctance to
apply the frustration doctrine in other contexts has already been noted. Anderson, Frustrationof

Contract-A Rejected Doctrine,3 DE PAUL L. REv. 1 (1953). It should also be emphasized that
the Class 2 seller's harm from contract enforcement is defined as the difference beween the new
market and contract prices, not the out-of-pocket loss he suffers from the rise in input cost,
because it would be out of the market/contract differential that he would meet this rise and obtain
his profit; the seller's loss, that is, is his inability to capture the gains inflation makes possible.
15. See notes 17-20 and accompanying text infra.
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would create an unacceptable threat to contract stability. 16
A.

THE HARSHNESS CASE FOR EXCUSE

The harshness case assumes that it is undesirable to impose large costs on
seller's. However, if their buyers can resell at the inflationary price, the
seller's costs are gains to buyers. Thus, to make the harshness case, it must be
shown that the satisfaction or utility (hereinafter both are referred to as
"satisfaction") that sellers lose by enforcement is greater than the
satisfaction buyers gain by it. This plainly is not always so. For example,
assume that the seller at bar is rich and without family while the buyer is
middle-class and will use the profits to pay the medical bills of his seriously
ill children. Many situations could be imagined in which most of us would
conclude that enforcement increases total satisfaction. Thus, the harshness
case cannot excuse every breach. Inquiries into the particular parties'
circumstances seem necessary.
However, the judicial process is unsuited to draw the comparisons
respecting relative satisfaction which these inquiries would entail. Two
reasons make this so. Initially, courts'often would be unable to get the facts
necessary to decide whether a seller's satisfaction loss would exceed his
buyer's satisfaction gain. The rules of evidence would exclude much of the
essential data because it would reflect issues, such as the parties' family
circumstances, traditionally considered irrelevant to contract litigation.
Even if the rules were relaxed, a serious "revealed preference problem"
would be created. Each party would attempt to reveal only those facts that
would improve his claim. Although this problem always obtains, it is
exacerbated when the relevant facts are so personal to the litigants that they
are difficult for outsiders to ascertain and assess. Also, when the litigants are
corporations, the effect of a decision bears on shareholders and employees.
Bringing them before the court, and ascertaining the possible impact of
alternative results on their lives, is apparently impossible. In addition, the
process of testimony and cross-examination seems unlikely to expose those
deeper attitudes and desires which may be most important to deciding what
result would actually maximize the parties' satisfaction.' 7
16.
17.

See notes 28-47 and accompanying text infra.
Respecting the question of comparisons of real income, Professor Little observed:

[slince people have different tastes, a comparison of the objective factors, money
incomes and prices and available goods, [is] insufficient. Even if two people of
different tastes had the same money incomes, and were always faced with the same
available goods at the same prices, it could not very well be said that they were

economic equals both before and after a change which greatly raised the prices of
everything which the one bought and the other did not buy. It appears that
comparisons of real income must be comparisons, in part at least, of mental states or
changes in mental states.
I. LrrTLE, A CRITQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMics 56-57 (2d ed. 1963).
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The judicial system is additionally unsuited to make comparisons
respecting relative satisfaction because these comparisons are only partly
factual: they also raise value conflicts of a kind courts should not attempt to
resolve. Most people think that the middle class buyer with the sick children
had a "better" use for the money than the rich seller without family.
However, in other cases the relevant values would be in dispute or inconclusive, and few people could agree on the right result. Assume that the buyer
tithed and the seller gambled; or the buyer had two children and the seller six.
Questions like these, involving relative wealth, need, and desert, are perhaps
the most hotly disputed ones our society faces. They are not questions which
the judicial process is designed to resolve.
Moreover, pursuit of the harshness case would impair contract stability.
When the seller would have to decide, after an inflation had occurred,
whether to perform or breach, neither he nor the buyer could predict the
outcome of a lawsuit. It would initially be difficult to know what values a
court or jury would pursue. If this were known, it would be very hard to
determine the result those values would direct. The judicial decision would
entail a comparison of the parties' circumstances. Neither party could
therefore predict it unless he knew enough about his adversary's circumstances to foresee how they might influence decision. People are seldom this
informed respecting the relative strangers with whom they deal. Were the
judicial outcome to be this uncertain, sellers seriously affected by inflation, or
other unexpected causes of price advances, would be strongly tempted to
breach. 's
Adopting a general rule that inflation always does or does not excuse,
based on satisfaction criteria, would avoid few of these difficulties. Any
general rule would be more arbitrary than the individual decisions just
discussed. A judge cannot imagine the actual impact on all affected parties of
a decision always to enforce or excuse. Asserting that either result would
produce more or less aggregate satisfaction, as a matter of fact, is simply
fantasy. Moreover, no set of generally accepted values directs judges to favor
sellers or buyers, considered as classes. Finally, any general rule would
probably be rife with exceptions because in individual cases the conclusion
that satisfaction would be maximized by a result opposite to the one the rule
requires would often seem obvious. The exceptions would make it more
difficult to predict the judicial decision; and unpredictability is in these
circumstances a temptation to breach.
The apparent impropriety' 9 and obvious difficulty of applying *the
18. For .a rigorous statement of the intuitive perception that uncertainty in these
circumstances would often lead to breach, see text following note 27 infra.
19.

The argument against the harshness case is a particular application of a broad theme,
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harshness case for excuse explain why courts reject it. Courts have always
been reluctant to make judgments of the kind that the harshness case makes
relevant. Whether that is so, these considerations support the decisions.
Making the decision to excuse or enforce turn on relative satisfaction would
lead to arbitrary results and would impair contract stability. 20
B.

THE DESERT CASE FOR EXCUSE

A judicially tenable case for excuse must rest not on the fact or magnitude of a
seller's loss but on the circumstances which engendered it. The commentators
often recognize this, the chief focus of their concern being the unforeseeability of the causal event. This leads to the potentially useful notion of
"desert"-the belief that sellers do not deserve the losses nor buyers the
gains which enforcement yields. The desert notion yields a precise and
appealing statement of a case for excuse because, unlike the harshness case, it
rests on widely acceptable values-that people should not be made to bear
losses they did not consent to risk, nor be deprived of gains *theybought the
right to enjoy. Thus, an "undeserved" loss will here mean a loss resulting
from the materializing of a risk a party was not paid to bear, or a gain a party
bought the right to enjoy but which a court prevented him from realizing by
excusing the other party. An "undeserved" gain will mean a gain a party did
not buy the right to enjoy or a loss resulting from a risk a party was paid to bear
but which a court shifted to his contract partner. When the market price of the
goods at issue rises by more than twice the foreseeable high, excuse would
minimize "undeserved" gains and losses. Thus an appealing case for excuse
that common law courts seldom can redistribute wealth in institutionally appropriate ways. For
a fuller statement of this general idea, see Schwartz, ProductsLiability and Judicial Wealth
Redistributions, 51 IND. L.J. 558 (1976).
20. Several commentators have urged courts in impossibility situations to split the losses
resulting from supervening events. E.g., Mueller, ContractRemedies: Business FactandLegal
Fantasy, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 833, 837; Comment, The Energy Crisisand Economic Impossibility
in Louisiana, 49 TUL. L. REV. 605, 616-23 (1975); Comment, Apportioning Loss After
Discharge of a Burdensome Contract: A Statutory Solution, 69 YALE L.J. 1054 (1960);
Comment, Loss Splitting in ContractLitigation, 18 U. Cm. L. REV. 153 (1950). A recent author
correctly observed that the proponents of loss-splitting never explain the desirability of that
cost distribution. Comment, The Economic Implications of the Doctrine of Impossibility, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1251, 1261 (1975). Although loss-splitting imposes equal monetary losses on the
parties, it will rarely impose equal burdens since the utility of a dollar to a party is a function of
his tastes and circumstances. Contract partners are quite unlikely to have the same tastes or be
in the same circumstances, and will thus value equal dollar losses unequally. If the object of the
loss-splitting proposal is merely to increase satisfaction by forcing each party to bear part of a
loss, it is subject to the objection made above: courts cannot judge the actual effect on
satisfaction of any particular loss-sharing configuration. The reluctance of courts to split losses
may reflect their recognition of this institutional limitation. Professor Birmingham also argues
that courts should use the frustration and impossibility doctrines to make distributional
judgments, but he does .not consider the objections raised above. See Birmingham, A Second
Look at the Suez Canal Cases:Excuse for Nonperformance of ContractualObligations in the
Light of Economic Theory, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1393 (1969).
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exists for some sellers adversely affected by unanticipated market-affecting
events. This conclusion is demonstrated by use of several hypotheticals, all
involving an unanticipated inflation.
The initial illustration assumes the following: (1) Two merchants
contract to sell corn. The seller does not then own the corn but will purchase it
shortly before delivery. 2 1 (2) Corn fluctuates in price. Knowing this, the
parties assume a particular range through which fluctuations will move. (3)
Buyers ordinarily expect sellers to deliver on a price rise. That is implicit in
contracts for future delivery at fixed prices. This buyer expectation necessarily implies the expectation that sellers bear standard price-affecting risks,
such as a short crop. These buyer expectations are known to sellers. The
contract price thus compensates the seller for bearing the risk of price rises; a
portion of the price is a premium for risk-taking. However, neither party
foresees a serious inflation. (4) An unexpected inflation does occur, attributable to expansionary monetary policy, and raises prices above the expected
fluctuation range. More precisely, the inflation raises all relevant prices-the
price of goods to the seller, the price at which people in the seller's market
resell, and the price at which buyers resell-by the same factor.
The initial problem utilizes these assumptions. The seller, S, is a dealer;
the buyer, B, a wholesaler. The contract price is $1.20 per bushel. When the
contract is made, the price to dealers like S-the price at elevators-is $1.00 a
bushel; the price to retailers-the price at which B expects to resell-is $1.50.
The parties assume that corn selling at $1.00 may fluctuate through a range
bounded by $.82 on the low side and $1.18 on the high side (i.e., - $.18).
They know the risk of these fluctuations is fully reflected in the current prices
dealers charge. This knowledge necessarily implies an expectation by B that S
will deliver for $1.20 if the price at elevators goes to $1.18, although if S
breached he could resell at $1.38.22 An unanticipated 50 percent inflation
occurs, raising the price at elevators to $1.50; from dealers like S to buyers
like B to $1.80; and from wholesalers like B to retailers to $2.25. Sbreaches,
buys the corn at $1.50, and resells to another at $1.80; B covers at $1.80 and
resells at $2.25.
Were S to be excused, his nominal profit would rise to $.30 (the
difference between $1.80 and the $1.50 he must pay), but in real terms he
would still make only $.20.23 However, he would save the loss of $. 18 which
21.

The hypothetical assumes a dealer who has not hedged. Such dealers seek profits

both from speculation and from the middleman service. The principles this hypothetical
illustrates also apply to certain manufacturers who make contracts for future delivery. These

manufacturers do not hedge against cost increases in their inputs either because they are
speculating or because no futures market exists for certain inputs, such as energy.
22. Le., $1.20 (contract price) + $.18 (dealer cost increase).
23. A 50% inflation reduces each dollar's value by one-third. Thus, the seller's "real"
profit, his profit in constant dollars, remains $.20 per bushel.

-
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he would haye incurred had the market stopped at $1.38. This saving is an
undeserved gain because S implicitly contracted to bear the risk of a price rise
to $1.38 and was compensated for doing so. Put another way, Swas paid to
forego the gain an $. 18 rise would create. B's new nominal profit would be
$.45 (the difference between his resale price of $2.25 and the cover cost of
$1.80), but in real terms would remain $.30. However, Bwould have lost the
$. 18 he could have realized had the market stopped at $1.38; that is, Bwould
have been able to purchase at $1.20 and resell at a price which reflected the
$.18 rise (i.e., $1.68). As B bought the right to enjoy this $.18 gain,
preventing him from recovering it would create an undeserved loss. Enforcement, on the other hand, requires S to pay $.60 in damages, the difference
between the contract ($1.20) and cover ($1.80) prices. Since Swas only paid
to bear the risk of an $.18 rise, $.42 of the $.60 damages represents an
undeserved loss. This $.42 is correspondingly an undeserved gain to B, as he
did not pay S to forego profiting from a price rise of that magnitude.
The above example illustrates that an appealing case for excuse sometimes exists. Enforcement would create an undeserved gain for B of $.42, the
increment of the price rise he did not buy the right to enjoy, and an undeserved
loss for S of $.42, the increment of the rise he was not paid to forego. By
losses of
contrast, excuse would result in corresponding undeserved gains and
24
only $. 18. Excuse thus minimizes undeserved gains and losses.
The desert case plainly does not always hold. Assume that an unanticipated inflation raised the price in the seller/buyer market from $1.20 to $1.54.
Were S to be excused, B would incur an undeserved loss of $. 18, the expected
rise. Enforcement, on the other hand, yields an undeserved loss to Sof $. 16,
the increment of the rise which S was not paid to forego (damages are $.34,
the difference between $1.54 and $1.20). Thus, enforcement here minimizes
the parties' undeserved gains and losses. The desert case therefore holds only
of the
when an unanticipated market-affecting event causes the market price
5
amount.
anticipated
the
twice
than
more
by
rise
to
issue
at
goods
24.

Had B, immediately after his contract with S, made a resale contract at, for example,

$1.50 a bushel, the desert case would still justify excuse. The price compensated S only for
bearing the risk of an $.18 rise; enforcement requires him to pay $.60 in damages, of which $.42
is an undeserved loss to him and an undeserved gain to B. Excuse, however, would then
apparently require B to cover at $1.80 to fulfill a contract paying him only $1.50, but the remedy
is to excuse B, as seller, on his resale contract.

25.

This relationship may be stated generally in algebraic form:

(1) Let PK = Contract price between S and B (i.e., $1.20).

R = Maximum expected price fluctuation range (i.e., $.18).

Pb= Buyer's expected resale price when original contract is made (i.e., $1.50).
Assume a price rise in the amount of R.
On excuse, S sells at (PK + R).
B sells at (Pb + R), and buys at (PK + R).
S's gain from excuse is R, B's loss from excuse is R.
Both gain and loss are undeserved.
(2) Let I = Inflationary rise factor (i.e., 50%).
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It is this "desert case" which seemingly underlies much of the claim that
sellers should be excused during severe inflations, and which may have
motivated the few recent excuse decisions. 2 6 Its validity will now be
examined. 2 7
III.

THE DESERT CASE AND CONTRACT STABILITY

The desert case is unsatisfactory because it would require courts to make
factual findings and economic judgments of such complexity that the parties
would often be unable to predict judicial outcomes. This uncertainty would
seriously threaten contract stability by making performance much more costly
to sellers than breach. For example, a seller confronted with a serious
inflation will compare performance and breach costs. The performance cost is
the difference between the market and contract prices, the sum he foregoes by
performing. The breach cost is the damages the seller would have to pay, here
the same market/contract differential, discounted by the probability of his
losing the suit. When that probability is much less than 100 percent, as when
the litigation outcome is quite uncertain, the performance cost substantially
On excuse, S sells at (PK + IPK).
B sells at (Pb + IPb), and buys at (PK + IPK).
S's gain from excuse is IPK, B's loss from excuse is IPK.
(3) On enforcement, in the case (1) situation, S's gain from excuse, R, becomes a loss,
also R, as Smust sell at PK. This is adeserved loss. LetDLbe the deserved loss (so that
DL, = seller's deserved loss). DL, = R. Similarly, in the inflation case, S's gain from
excuse, IPK, is converted into a loss from enforcement;also IPK, as Smust sell at PK.
(4) When IPK - DL,>O, enforcement produces for San undeserved loss; IPK is the
total loss from enforcement and DL s the deserved loss from enforcement. Conversely
enforcement produces for B an undeserved gain, as he realized more than R, that is,
IPK.

(5) When IPK - DL,>DLs, the undeserved loss to S exceeds the deserved loss (and
conversely for B).
(6) IPK - DL,>DL, when IPK>2DL,. As DL, = R, the expected high, IPK - R>R
when IPK>2R. Thus when the inflationary rise (IPK) more than doubles the expected
rise (R) enforcement maximizes undeserved gains and losses. The case for excuse is
made.
26. Unfortunately, courts seldom state the actual grounds of decisions to excuse or
enforce. Nevertheless, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently explained its
affirmance of a decision excusing a seller from compliance because of an unforeseeable labor
dispute by observing that when a risk materializes which has "such severe consequences" that
it "must have been beyond the scope of the assignment of risks inherent in the contract"
requiring performance "would be to grant the promisee an advantage for which he could not be
said to have bargained in making the contract." Mishara Constr. Co. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete
Corp., 365 Mass. 122, 310 N.E.2d 363,367 (1974). This is the desert case, although in a different
context.
27. A third theme also contributes to the distaste for enforcement. While excuse deprives
buyers of speculative gains, enforcement often imposes out-of-pocket losses on sellers.
Although the economic cost of these misfortunes is identical, some probably feel that a party
cares less about being forced to forego a speculative gain than to incur a net loss, or that society
should be more concerned to prevent reductions in a party's estate than to protect gains to it.
Sellers should thus be excused. This third theme plays a less significant role than those set out
in the text; applying it would also entail many of the same difficulties inherent in the desert
case. It does, however, raise an important issue, perhaps best pursued in other contexts,
respecting when the law should treat identical economic costs differently.
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exceeds the breach cost, thereby creating a significant irlcentive to breach.
For example, assume the contract price was $1.20, the market rose to $1.80,
and the seller thought he had only a 70 percent chance of losing a suit. The
performance cost would be $.60 while the breach cost-the risk of breach-is
28
$.42 (.70 x $.60). The seller thus is likely to breach.
Courts would face three difficulties in applying the desert case: (1)
ascertaining the expected fluctuation range; (2) deciding whether the cause of
the market advance was foreseeable, and (3) ascertaining whether that cause
was principally responsible for the advance. Again, discussion will focus
primarily on inflation as a paradigm case.
A.

THE EXPECTED FLUCTUATION RANGE

The desert case requires excuse only when the actual price rise more than
doubles the expected high. 29 Applying it thus requires a finding as to what
the expected high was. This finding will be difficult to make because the
expected high is a fictional concept adopted for expositional purposes.
Although the parties know that prices may rise, they foresee the possibility
in terms of several future prices, each having a different probability of
occurrence. Thus, their expectations are not represented by a point but by a
curve of possible future prices discounted by their respective probabilities.
Excuse would then minimize undeserved gains and losses when the actual
price rise more than doubles the outside point on the curve, or points to
which the parties attached a sufficiently low probability as to ignore.
Therefore, courts must ascertain the shape and scale of the future price
curve. When the contract is silent and the parties otherwise say nothing
respecting fluctuations, a common situation, this entails reconstructing a
curve from tacit expectations alone, an obviously difficult job. The contract
price is irreducibly ambiguous. It is the product of many factors, including
predictions of market participants respecting future price levels, but it
discloses nothing about how those factors were assessed. Past history is
germane but would often be inconclusive. Even if the instant price rise is the
largest on record, it may have been anticipated if current market factors
differed from past ones; whether they did, and how the differences cut, will
28. Performance cost often equals damages in contract cases, so that uncertainty as to
judicial outcomes would frequently create an incentive to breach. This partly explains the
courts' emphasis on predictability in contract law. The textual discussion is nevertheless too
simple, as it presupposes that the seller is not risk-averse. More seriously, goodwill losses must
be added to damages when computing breach cost. When the seller's out-of-pocket increment
of performance cost is large, however, performance may create "secondary" losses, such as
the inability to fulfill business plans because of the cash shortage resulting from buying high and
selling low. These secondary costs may often outweigh the good-will loss from breach. When
that is so, litigation uncertainty would acutely threaten contract stability.
29.

See text accompanying notes 21-27 supra.
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usually be hard factual issues. Other evidence, such as negotiations by
different parties or market letters, might help, but that evidence too would
often fail to shed much light on what the parties at bar assumed, or should
have assumed.30
It may be objected that since actual price rises are likely to exceed
expected ones by a wide margin in disastrous inflations, limiting excuse to
such inflations would relieve courts from finding the future price curve with
precision. Put simply, sellers can make out a prima facie case for excuse on
this issue by proving a disastrous inflation because the economic effects of
such inflations are likely to outstrip the parties' expectations by the requisite
margin. Moreover, the parties would be able to predict judicial outcomes as
they too would know when the heavens had fallen. This objection may be
tenable for catastrophic inflations such as the German one of 1920-23.
However, many inflations fall far short but are nonetheless serious. In them,
changing the factual referrent from "future price curve" to "disastrous
inflation" would seldom make judicial outcomes more predictable. For
example, is a 40 percent inflation disastrous? Did the United States
experience "disastrous" inflations in 1946 and in 1973 and 1974?31
Ascertaining the expected fluctuation range is the initial obstacle to
judicial application of the desert case for excuse. Unfortunately, the last two
elements of this case would also be difficult to apply.
B.

FORESEEABHI

The appeal of the desert case derives primarily from the view that a party
should not be made to bear costs resulting from risks he did not consent to
take. The desert case thus presupposes that the event relied on to excuse was
unforeseeable, since neither party consents to bear costs resulting from
unforeseeable risks. Sellers do implicitly consent to bear foreseeable
30. Professor Michael Levine of the University of Southern California Law Center has
pointed out that the parties' expectations may in fact be asymmetric. The price reflects the
aggregate expectations of market participants, but the litigating parties may have different
subjective views as to the expected fluctuation range. This may not be unusual in markets where
speculation is frequent, as people apparertly speculate because they hold unrepresentative
beliefs as to future prices. See Hirshleifer, Speculationand Equilibrium:Information Risk and
Markets, 89 Q.J. EcoN. 519 (1975). Thus, a court may sometimes have to find two expected price
fluctuation curves, not one. Actual rises which more than doubled the outside of both parties'
curves would satisfy the case for excuse, while rises clearly within both curves would not. The
parties might assign such differing values to the expected high, however, that the desert case
would be nondirective for inflations of certain extents. A court would then have to decide which
party's expected price fluctuation prediction was the more reasonable, making litigation even
less predictable.
31. German courts, probably in response to difficulties such as these, only began excusing
when the inflation became truly extraordinary. See Dawson, Effects of Inflation on Private
Contracts:Germany, 1914-1924, 33 MICH. L. REV. 171, 180-200 (1934).
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price-affecting risks when they agree to fixed-price contracts. Some who
breach during inflations, however, will not have foreseen-will not have
subjectively consented to bear-the risk of the price-affecting event which
materialized; and many sellers can plausibly claim they did not. The issue
for courts is whether the particular risk should have been foreseen. The
evidence respecting the foreseeability of inflations is, however, usually
inconclusive, which again implies that judicial outcomes based upon the
desert case would be difficult to predict.
The argument that modem inflations are foreseeable begins with the
fact that price is a function of consumer income.3 2 Thus, parties concerned
to predict future prices must, and often do, make predictions respecting
income.13 Consumer income itself varies directly with aggregate demand,
the total demand yielded by consumption, private investment, and government spending. Market participants must therefore estimate aggregate
demand for relevant future periods. One doing this may be expected to
realize that "[E]very inflation in U.S. history has been associated with a too
rapid expansion of nominal aggregate demand." '3 4 These expansions are
caused by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, the pursuit of which is
frequently public knowledge. Moreover, such policies are often initiated
during wars, a fact which by now seems well known.35 The widespread use
of escalator clauses in private contracts3 6 thus evidences the apparent
foreseeability of government-caused inflationary price rises.
32. G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 34 (3d ed. 1966).
33. For an explanation of how predictions respecting aggregate income are included in
price forecasts, see S. KROLL & I. SHISHKO, THE COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET GUIDE 186-93

(1973).
34. C. BAIRD, MACROECONOMICS: AN INTEGRATION OF MONETARY, SEARCH, AND INCOME
THEORIES 258 (1973) (emphasis original).
35. Apparently, all inflations in American history save one, the slow rise in prices between
1896 and 1914, have been associated with increases in the money supply effected by government
attempts to finance wars. See AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH: AN ECONOMIST'S HISTORY OFTHE
UNITED STATES 363-65 (L.Davis, R. Easterlin & W. Parker eds. 1972). See alsoA. ALCHIAN & W.
ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 672-73 (3d ed. 1972); W. PETERSON, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
MACRO 46-47 (1974).
36. [A] price escalation clause permits the seller to adjust a currently determined price
: . to reflect subsequent changes in the cost to the seller of specific items directly or
indirectly involved in the manufacturing of the product or provision of the service.
Stothoff, Escalation Clauses . . . Are Escalating,CONFERENCE BOARD RECORD, Dec. 1973, at
23. Such clauses usually contain a description of the cost elements to be escalated, a stipulation of
the indices by which cost changes are measured-for example, the Metal and Metal Products

Index-and the limit within which fluctuations may occur (e.g., price may go up or down no more
than 15%). For observations as to how common these clauses are becoming, see id.; On the
Escalator,in Wall Street Journal, Mar. 10, 1974, at 4, col. 15; Machine Tools; Forcedto the
Escalator,IRON AGE, Apr. 15, 1974, at 36; Suppliers' Unfirm Prices Push ContractorsToward
EscalatorClauses in Bids, in Am CONDITIONING, HEATING & REFRIGERATION NEWS, Aug. 1973,

at 28.
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Other significant causes of price rises may also have been foreseeable.
For example, the most recent serious shortage was in oil. The belief that the
Arab states could not use oil as a political weapon was widespread because
those states had seldom acted effectively in concert. They did act effectively
in concert. But that political factors could affect oil prices seemed
knowable. Moreover, the long-standing use of broad force majeure clauses
evidences the apparent foreseeability of significant market-affecting
37
events.
The argument that such events are often unforeseeable is based on the
failure of many parties to foresee recent economic expansions. For example,
the "real" rate of interest (the nominal rate less the percent by which
inflation increased) on prime commercial paper in 1969 and 1972, two
inflationary years, was 2.4 percent and 1.4 percent, respectively, 38 suggesting that professional lenders badly underestimated the existence and extent
of inflationary pressures. There were similar miscalculations by many
nonfinancial corporations. 39 The energy crisis also plainly found many
sellers unprepared. Since so many professionals made mistakes, it seems
plausible to infer that the data which would permit accurate predictions was
lacking.
Evidentiary conflicts of this kind would make judicial outcomes
difficult to predict for two reasons. First, the evidence in particular cases
would often be inconclusive. Second, because of this, judicial decision
would probably turn on matters extraneous to the foreseeability issue. The
most likely of these would be the effect on the parties of enforcement or
excuse; courts would compare satisfactions under the guise of foreseeability. The outcome of these comparisons, as noted previously, is often
impossible to predict.
It may again be objected that disastrous inflations or radical supply
interruptions are most frequently unforeseeable; thus these prediction
difficulties would be obviated if courts only excused in such cases. The
objection has force in an inflation like the German one, but the factual
referrent "disastrous" would too often be insufficiently directive.
37.

Commentators thus claim that in, 1956, concerned parties were aware of the possibility

that the Suez canal might be closed. See Berman, Excuse for Nonperformance in the Light of
ContractPracticesin InternationalTrade, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1422-23 (1963); Schlegal, Of
Nuts, and Ships and Sealing Wax, Suez, and FrustratingThings-The Doctrine of Impossibility
of Performance, 23 RUTGERS L. REv. 419, 430 (1969).
38. W. PERSON, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS MACRO 54 (1974).
39. See Bach & Stephenson, Inflation and the Redistributionof Wealth, 56 REv. ECON. &
STAT. 1 (1974).
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40

The desert case for excuse assumes that the seller has not agreed to bear the
risk of a serious inflation. A causation problem exists because actual price
rises are often the result of several causes, the risks of some of which sellers
do usually agree to bear. Thus, a court cannot excuse without isolating and
evaluating inflation's contribution to the price rise at issue. In this section it is
shown that: (1) price rises do have multiple causes; (2) a case for excuse
ordinarily exists only when inflation produced more than 50 percent of the
price rise at issue; (3) it will be extraordinarily difficult for courts to isolate
inflation's contribution; so that (4) were courts to use the desert case, the
parties would often be unable to predict the judicial outcome on the
causation issue.
Inflation occurs when nominal aggregate demand exceeds the
economy's productive capacity. Output cannot expand quickly enough to
satisfy the increased demand, with the result that resources become scarce
and therefore more expensive. Individual prices, however, do not necessarily rise at the same rate as the general price level 4' because inflation does not
affect the causes of changes in relative prices. For example, assume that
product A originally costs less than product B. Without inflation, consumer
tastes changed so that more people want A and less want B. The price of A
will rise; the price of B will drop. An inflation would then increase the
prices of both products. With respect to a manufacturer of A who has made a
contract for future delivery at the original price, the market increase-and
hence the seller's loss from compliance with the contract-may be
substantial, but only a small fraction of this loss may result from inflation.
However, the case for excuse can only be made when (1) the price rise
more than doubled the expected high; 42 and (2) inflation caused more than
50 percent of the rise. This is so because, were inflation's contribution to be
less than one-half, excuse would maximize undeserved gains and losses. To
illustrate this, assume that the parties foresaw no inflation, that the contract
price was $5, and that the expected price range up was $2, but the actual
advance more than doubled this, being $4.20. Let inflation cause $2.05 of
this rise; normal foreseeable supply factors, $2.15. Excuse saves S $4.20,
the difference between the contract price ($5) and the market price ($9.20).
Of this sum, $2.15 is an undeserved gain to S and an undeserved loss to B,
as S was paid to forego losses caused by normal, foreseeable events.
40. The textual discussion which follows exclusively concerns inflations. For an explanation of its application to price rises resulting from unanticipated supply shortages, see note 46

infra.
41. C. BAIRD, MACROECONOMICS: AN INTEGRATION OF MONETARY, SEARCH, AND INCOME
THEORIES 254 (1973).
42. See notes 21-26 and accompanying text supra.
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Enforcement would cause S a loss of $4.20 (B's damages) of which only
$2.05 is undeserved (and an undeserved gain to B), being the result of an
unforeseeable inflation. Thus, enforcementminimizes undeserved gains and
losses, and always will when inflation causes less than one-half of the price
rise at issue. 43 Courts must therefore find which portion of the rise was

attributable to inflation.
If the other operative cause was a change in consumer tastes, as in the
illustration above, ascertaining inflation's contribution seems terribly
difficult. Sellers very roughly know their own demand curves and ultimately
recognize shifts in them. 44 Yet how much of a particular shift is attributable
to a change in tastes and how much to a general increase in aggregate
demand seems very hard to know without market surveys. Yet these surveys
are costly-too costly to be done for many lawsuits. Moreover, surveys may
be inconclusive. A buyer himself might not know whether he bought the hat
because hats had become fashionable, or because his income went up, or for
both reasons.
In addition, a product may increase in price because of (1) a rise in the
price of demand-related goods: if the price of butter goes up, more buyers
43. This illustration's assumptions seem inconsistent with those used to develop the desert
case initially, because it is assumed here that S was paid to risk some price rises above the
expected fluctuation range. The new assumptions, made explicit in this note, add realism to the
argument. The text now assumes that sellers are expected to deliver on all price rises within the
expected range, however caused, because the parties seem to share this assumption. Their
motive apparently is that as price rises can have many causes, it is not worth analyzing causation
when the market result remains normal. The text also assumes, again because the parties seem to,
that sellers bear the risk of price rises above the range-although perhaps not those substantially
above it-if those rises result from standard, foreseeable price-affecting events. This assumption
follows largely from the lack of evidence of a custom to share the risks arising from such events.
Rather, the scanty evidence which exists is the other way. Risk-sharing seems to be accomplished
through the use of escalator clauses. However, these are used mainly in times of economic
upheaval. They are meant to allocate the risk of events such as inflation, depression, and so forth,
not to split the risks of standard, foreseeable price-affecting events. Also, as courts have always
fully allocated these risks to the parties-sellers bear the risk of rises, buyers of declines-the
parties to a fixed-price contract which is silent respecting risk-sharing may be presumed to share
the courts' construction of their intentions. Sellers, in sum, are assumed to bear the consequences of standard, foreseeable risks unless they say otherwise. Thus, the desert case applies only
when the full or major cause of a price rise is a nonstandard, unforeseeable event, such as
inflation, embargo, war, tidal wave, etc.
44. Baird describes the difficulty sellers have in recognizing shifts in their demand curves:
The position of the demand curve faced by any seller is not known with certainty.
Each seller's sales rate fluctuates up and down from day to day. For a given set of
demand conditions these sales rates are distributed around some mean (average). If this
sales distribution is shifted to the left by a restrictive monetary policy, at first the lower
sales rate will be interpreted as coming from the lower end of an unchanged distribution.
Only after time will the seller become convinced that his demand curve has shifted
down.
C. BAIRD, MACROECONOMICS: AN INTEGRATION OF MONETARY, SEARCH, AND INCOME THEORIES

273 (1973). See also id. at 53, 274. This information problem also exists when, because of
expansionary policies, the sales distribution shifts to the right.
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will switch to margarine, its principal substitute, the price of which will then
rise; or (2) a drop in the price of supply related goods: if the price of wool
drops, less will be produced, thereby reducing the supply and increasing the
price of mutton. 45 Let product A rise in price. If the increase was caused by
the price rise of a substitute which itself was not a function of inflation, or a
drop in price of a supply-related product, the A seller's contract should be
enforced; conversely, if the A price rise was the result of the inflationary
price increase of an important substitute, the A seller should be excused.
This makes germane, in an action against a breaching seller, the price
movements of supply and demand related goods, the causes of these
movements, and their contribution to the price rise at issue. The lawsuit
would be quite complex.
Price rises also are a function of supply elasticity. When faced with an
inflationary demand increase, an industry with slack capacity-where
supply is relatively elastic-will expand output; prices will not rise by
much. An industry already at full capacity, however, will in the short run
ration output by price. In the latter case, inflation and supply inelasticity
both contributed to the price rise. Such short-run supply inelasticity in an
industry seems sufficiently important and knowable that the risk of its
adverse impact on prices can be classed as ordinary. Therefore, since sellers
bear ordinary price-affecting supply risks, a court must distinguish the
effects of inflation from those of supply elasticity, which again seems quite
difficult.
Finally, when multiple factors cause a price rise, relative causation is
extraordinarily difficult to establish. A particular rise may be a function of
taste changes, substitute price changes, supply inelasticity, government
regulation and increases in aggregate demand. Economic analysis can tell us
with relative convenience which potential causes contributed to the price
rise at issue; but it cannot isolate (even approximately) the contribution of
each factor without a large, complex econometric model of the industry,
specifying accurately the supply and demand sides of the market. The model
would then require a great deal of data for its operation. The costs of doing
this would seem almost always to outweigh the gains either party could
derive from a lawsuit. Yet without such a model, the desert case would be
nondirective in multiple cause cases. It would require a finding which absent
the model could not be made, that an unanticipated inflation caused more
than 50 percent of the price rise at bar. Any decision to excuse would
46
therefore be arbitrary.
45. 1. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 27 (1976); G. STIGLER, THE THEORY
OF PRICE 23, 31-33 (3d ed. 1966).
46. Causation may seem easily established when an isolated event, such as an embargo,
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To summarize, the causation issue-which ihicrement of an unanticipated price rise was caused by inflation-raises factual questions that are
tortuously difficult to resolve, and which often may not be litigated fully
because the costs to the litigants of developing the facts will often exceed the
gains to them of doing so. Decisions to excuse would therefore often be
arbitrary. The opinions would specify a variety of factual circumstances
without coherent explanations of their relevance. With the meaning of the
causation requirement so obscure, the parties would have little guidance as
to the consequences of breach, with the inimical effect on contract stability
already explored. Moreover, sellers affected by cost increases resulting only
from risks they had agreed to bear might nevertheless breach, attributing the
increases to government economic policy, the risk of which they did not
assume. Because the government so frequently pursues expansionary
policies, which have widespread effects, many of these claims might appear
superficially plausible. The difficulty of isolating the contribution of
inflation to a price rise would make the appearance hard to dispel.4 7
SUMMARY

The cases offer four reasons for requiring sellers to pay: (1) since sales
contracts allocate market fluctuation risks, the promisor is bound to
produces the price rise. This is sometimes true with respect to sales of the affected item itself, but
simplicity disappears when the product becomes a factor in the production of other things. For
example, the rise in agricultural prices is sometimes said to result from the energy crisis, which
raised the price of many agricultural inputs. Yet agricultural economists show that several
events, including shifts in consumer tastes, inflation, and government agricultural policy
contributed in complex ways to the food price increases. See Hathaway, Food Prices and
Inflation, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTION 63, 83-102 (A. Okun & G. Perry eds. 1974).
See also Carter, The 1975 Report of the President's Council of Economic Advisers: Food and
Agriculture, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 533, 536 (1975).
47. Courts in sales cases apparently do not mention the causation problem explicity,
although they seem influenced by it. A federal district court, however, partly explained its refusal
to revise upward the rental term of a 10-year lease which inflation allegedly made obsolete by
noting:
Sorting out how much of inflation is attributable to deficit budgets to finance essential
federal programs, how much results from oil price increases by OPEC countries, how
much from uncontrolled collective bargaining agreements, and how much from other
domestic and international causes, would be a fearsome task. A court should not,
without Congressional guidance, single out a particular landlord or other victim of
inflation to be compensated at.the expense of all the other taxpayers in the United
States.
Brubrad Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 404 F. Supp. 691,695-96 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (respecting
a lease with the Postal Service, the court held that the Service need only pay the 1964 rental until
termination).
Professor Dawson has also suggested that one source of judicial reluctance to intervene in
private bargains affected by inflation may lie in the difficulty of distinguishing monetary from
supply-demand causes of rising prices. Dawson & Cooper, The Effect of Inflation on Private
Contracts: United States, 1861-1879, 33 MIcH. L. REv. 852, 871, 892-93, 913-14 (1935).
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perform;4 8 (2) that performance has become more burdensome is no
50
excuse; 49 (3) the promisor should have foreseen the event causing the loss;
and (4) the promisor should have protected himself against the price rise at
issue.5 1 The first two of these are tautologies. The last two do not explicitly
respond to the desert case for excuse, but they do suggest an awareness of its
administrative difficulties. That case, as previously noted, rests on widely
acceptable values-that people should neither bear unpleasant consequences
they have not agreed to risk nor be deprived of gains they bought the right to
enjoy. The appeal of these values may largely explain the commentators'
distaste for the courts' results. Yet the desert case seems too complex for
courts to apply. The risk of pursuing it is that the utility of forward sales
contracts may be seriously impaired. The complexity and the risk largely
explain the courts' longstanding decision to enforce. More importantly, they
justify it, as do the macroeconomic considerations to which consideration
52
must now be given.
48. E.g., Pacific Trading Co. v. Mouton Rice Milling Co., 184 F.2d 141, 149 (8th Cir. 1950)
("The fluctuation in market prices is within the contemplation of the parties to every contract to
sell for future delivery, and the risk of loss attendant upon it is assumed by the buyer and seller
alike in the absence of an explicit provision against it in the contract.").
49. E.g., Gross v. Exeter Mach. Works, Inc., 277 Pa. 363,368,121 A. 195, 197 (1923) ("The
affidavit [of seller] also avers that, owing to the abnormal demand for rolling mill products,
defendant was unable to obtain the required material 'within any reasonable bounds of effort or
expense'; but that is unavailing; mere hardship or difficulty is no excuse for failure to perform a
contract. . . .[citations omitted]").
50. E.g., Maple Farms, Inc. v. City School Dist., 76 Misc. 2d 1080, 1085,352 N.Y.S.2d 784,
789 (Sup. Ct. 1974) ("[A]ny businessman should have been aware of the general inflation in this
country during the previous years and of the chance of crop failures.").
51. E.g., Terry Contracting v. Commercial Ins. Co., 16 Misc. 2d 475,476, 156 N.Y.S.2d
285, 287 (Sup. Ct. 1956) ("He [the seller] made no attempt to protect himself. . . against a rise in
the price of steel during the period necessarily intervening before plaintiff might require
delivery.").
52. Some commentators suggest that courts should revise the price term to reflect the
unanticipated event rather than excuse. See note 3 supra.The suggestion is untenable if made in
pursuit of the harshness case, since courts can neither find the facts nor make the value choices
required to fix a "fair" price. The unpredictability the effort would foster would also seriously
impair contract stability. Price fixing in pursuit of the desert.case, however, seems justifiable. A
price could be set to ensure the buyer his speculative gain, thereby imposing a deserved loss on
the seller, but also to prevent windfall profits. For example, in the textual illustration accompanying notes 21-24 supra,the contract price was $1.20, the expected rise was $.18 and the price at
which parties like Ssold and Bbought rose to $1.80. Were a court to fix S's price at $1.62, B would
have his deserved gain of $.18, as he would resell in a market reflecting a wholesale cost of $1.80;
S would incur a deserved loss of $.18, as he would be compelled to sell below the $1.80 market
price. Nevertheless, B would have to pay $.42 above the contract price, thereby ensuring that he
realized no undeserved gain, nor San undeserved loss. Unfortunately, this happy outcome seems
precluded by the administrative difficulties just discussed. To fix prices in this way courts would
have to ascertain the future price curves, find that the event causing the rise was unforeseeable,
and resolve the causation issue. Courts are incompetent to perform these tasks, and the effort
would again unacceptably impair contract stability.
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MACROECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
Enforcement maximizes the use of escalator clauses, which are antiinflationary. Every sale for future delivery is attended with the risk that a
subsequent inflation may adversely affect a party's costs. If sellers are
excused, buyers bear this "inflation risk"; if contracts are enforced, sellers
bear it. Escalator clauses, which permit a seller to adjust the contract price to
reflect subsequent cost changes, minimize the seller's inflation risk. 53 The
magnitude of this risk is partly a function of supply elasticity; prices rise
more in industries operating close to capacity before the demand increase. A
seller who deals directly with manufacturers or suppliers has a better
opportunity to know supply conditions than his buyers and is therefore more
likely to predict accurately the effect an inflation would have on his
industry. Thus, assigning the inflation risk to sellers, i.e., enforcing, yields
more escalator clauses than would the contrary risk allocation.
IV.

It may be responded that, were buyers to bear the risk (i. e., were sellers
to be excused), knowledgeable sellers would offer escalator clauses so as to
reduce buyer risks, and thus buyer costs. This objection ignores the parties'
unequal access to information and their incentives. The buyers' inflation
risk is the risk that his seller will breach and be excused, so that the buyer
would incur the expense of making two purchases and lose his expected
speculative profit. The value of this risk is partly a function of the likelihood
of the seller breaching-of, that is, there occurring an inflation of the
requisite extent. If a buyer, because he lacks supply information, incorrectly
believes that a serious inflationary price rise is unlikely, he also subjectively believes that the value of the inflation risk is less than it actually
is. Thus he perceives an artificially low purchase cost. A seller would have
no incentive to dispel this erroneous belief. Initially, as sellers in this legal
regime are excused in the event of a serious inflation, they have little need
for escalator clauses. Also, these clauses may reduce the chance of sellers
escaping the deal.54 Finally, the fact of a seller offering an escalator clause
may inform the buyer that he was undervaluing the inflation risk, and thus
had an artificially low cost perception. Since more goods are purchased at
lower prices, the awareness that costs are higher than they seem is one sellers
do not want buyers to have. Therefore, were the inflation risk assigned to
buyers, fewer escalator clauses would be used than now are.
The "macro" benefit of maximizing the use of these clauses is that
53. See note 36 supra.The argument in Section IV applies only to the inflationproblem of
course.
54. One recent case, for example, read an escalator clause as shifting the risk of foreseeable cost increases to buyers but imposing the risk of unforeseeable increases on sellers. See

Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 17 UCC REP. SEav. 989 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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they produce price reductions when demand drops, and thus assist
government measures to fight inflation. 55 This occurs because escalator
clauses reduce the unpleasant side effects of anti-inflationary actions,
making it more likely that they will be undertaken. For example, a
restrictive monetary policy reduces aggregate demand. Manufacturers
initially faced with decreased demand reduce output rather than price,
because they do not know whether the decrease will continue. Reducing
output produces unemployment. Since unemployment is politically unpopular, there is pressure against the government reducing the money supply. A
reduction, however, would cause relatively prompt price declines in some
markets sensitive to economic trends, such as commodities and raw
materials. These declines, which are reflected in standard indices, trigger
escalation clauses, causing sellers to reduce prices rather than output. This
maintains employment. Thus, escalator clauses reduce the pressure on
government not to reduce the money supply, thereby aiding it to fight
inflation. Other things being equal, courts should then adopt rules
encouraging the use of these clauses. To be sure, as inflations are sometimes
hard to anticipate and as the supply effect may be limited, imposing the risk
of inflation on sellers may not yield many more escalator clauses than would
the opposite risk allocation. Also, as theories of what actually motivates
government decisionmakers are quite primitive, the anti-inflationary impact
of these clauses is speculative. However, some macro gains may flow from
maximizing their use and none seem to flow from their absence. 5 6
V.

SECTION 2-615 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
Section 2-615 excuses a seller "if performance . . . has been made
impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made . . . . 57
This rubbery language only reproduces the common law rules of frustration
and impossibility, and therefore permits courts to do what they have always
done. However, comment 4 to section 2-615 expresses the draftsmen's hope
that the section excuse sellers in certain of the situations discussed here:
55. For commentary on the anti-inflationary effects of escalator clauses, see Giersch,
Index Clauses and the Fight Against Inflation, in ESSAYS ON INFLATION AND INDEXATION I
(American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research 1974); Friedman, Monetary Correction, in id. at 25.
56. Some economists claim that under some circumstances escalator clauses may accelerate the rate of inflation by producing rapid price rises. See Bernstein, Indexing Money Payments
in a Large and ProlongedInflation, in id. at 71; Ritter, Book Review, 13 J.ECON. LIT. 925,926
(1975). This claim seems unpersuasive, since the inflation rate is exogenously determined-that
is, it is a function of aggregate demand, not individual firm costs, and aggregate demand is itself a
function of national income. Escalator clauses do transmit the effects of inflation quickly and
evenly, but his has no effect on the rate and is otherwise desirable on equity grounds.
57. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615.
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[A] severe shortage of raw materials or of supplies due to a
contingency such as war, embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen
shutdown of major sources of supply or the like, which . . .
causes a marked increase in cost.

58
of this section.

. .

is within the contemplation

Two justifications of this use of section 2-615 may be attempted: (1) it
codifies the authorities; or (2) it is a justifiable application of the section.
The first justification cannot be made. The only authority the draftsmen
cited in direct support of comment 4 is a lower court English case5 9 which
excused a seller who imported wheat to make flour from complying with a
contract to sell flour because of the market disturbances World War I
caused. However, the contract, made on July 27, 1914, authorized the seller
to cancel "in case of prohibition of export

.

.

.

preventing shipment or

delivery of wheat to this country...,"6 and 21 countries, including some
substantial English suppliers, prohibited the export of wheat. 61 The court,
relying exclusively on the contract, held that th; quoted clause was meant to
apply to serious interferences with the English supply, and not only to the
total prohibition of imports, since it was inconceivable that England would
ever be completely cut off from external sources of wheat. 62
The Code comments go on to cite two American cases in support of the
position that sellers should be excused when the parties "contemplated or
assumed" that the goods were to be obtained from "a particular source of
supply," and it failed through casualty. 63 These authorities not only fail to
support the position, but contradict the claim that unexpected and dramatic
cost increases excuse sellers. One case 64 involved a contract to deliver
timber from a particular place. The court held that the seller was not liable
for failing to deliver timber that had been destroyed by fire but refused to
excuse him from delivering the remainder, although the fire caused the
delivery cost to rise to about $20.00 per cord and the contract price was
$5.50. In the other, 65 the court refused to excuse a seller where delivery was
prevented by an embargo the European powers imposed in World War I,
and where, as a result, the price of the domestic substitute rose from $.075
to $1.00 per pound. The comments cite no other cases which even purport to
58.

Id., Comment 4.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Ford & Sons (Oldham) v. Henry Leetham & Sons, 31 T.L.R. 522 (K.B. Div. 1915).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 523.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-615, Comment 5.

64. International Paper Co. v. Rockefeller, 161 App. Div. 180, 146 N.Y.S. 371 (1914).
65. Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Chem. Works, 178 App. Div. 855, 166
N.Y.S. 179 (1917).
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excuse sellers in the circumstances described in this Article, and, as Section
66
I shows, pre-Code law plainly required performance.
The conclusion comment 4 draws-that sellers should be excusedalso fails to follow from its premise, that performance was affected by an
unforeseen contingency. Such a contingency imposes costs on both parties.
Whether sellers should be excused turns on whether the desert case for
excuse can be made out. The draftsmen, however, made no effort to
establish the case in the circumstances they describe. Indeed, they failed to
perceive the necessity of doing so. Moreover, nothing in section 2-615's
language, comments, or history indicate which case for excuse the statute
adopted; nor do these materials reveal any perception of the threat to
contract stability that all cases for excuse raise, or any awareness of the
possible anti-inflationary effect of the decision to enforce. Courts should
therefore refuse to accept comment 4's invitation to apply section 2-615 to
67
the inflation problem.
CONCLUSION
Courts generally enforce sales contracts although the seller's performance

was made more costly by unanticipated events. Two arguments may be
made against this result: (1) imposing large costs on sellers is unacceptably
66. See notes 7-8 and accompanying text supra.
67. This Article does not consider legislative solutions explicitly directed to these problems; its scope is limited to the remedies that sales law affords. Legislative solutions may have
advantages over judicial ones. In particular, legislatures may appropriately resolve many of the
value conflicts the harshness case would raise. Legislatures are also permitted grosser classifications than those courts may make. For example, a statute could excuse all sellers of a certain kind
who contracted between specified times-presuming that the desert case would require excuse
for enough of them to make the classification justifiable. However, the "distributional"
judgments of the harshness case do seem more difficult than those legislatures ordinarily make:
the affected parties are business professionals who often are in the same social and economic
classes, thereby precluding the standard distributional classifications of "rich," "middleclass,"
and "poor." Moreover, as parties in the same trade have apparently had disparate success in
resolving these problems (see note 12 supra),any classification based on the desert case might be
excessively inaccurate. Thus far no significant legislative relief has issued. Congress recently
passed the Small Business Emergency Relief Act, 89 Stat. 1095 (1975), affecting government
contractors who (1) are "small businesses" within the meaning of the federal act (72 Stat. 384
(1958)), and (2) made fixed-price government contracts, the performance of which was affected
by "significant" unanticipated cost increases, between August 15, 1971 and October 31, 1974. An
object of this Act is to prevent the contractors from suffering "financial ruin," but the relief
provided is only to authorize government agencies, in their discretion, to excuse contractors from
performance, a power business buyers now possess. SeeH.R. Rep. 94-154, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1975); S. Rep. 94-378, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975). Under prior law, the government had to
enforce all procurement contracts. The House bill also authorized government agencies to
increase prices on certain contracts if that would most efficiently aid procurement, but this the
Senate rejected. See H.R. 5541, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 121 CoNG. REc. S. 18993 (daily ed.
Oct. 30, 1975).
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harsh; (2) often, a'substantial portion of those costs are "undeserved," in
that they reflect the materializing of risks which sellers did not.agree to bear.
The first argument is judicially inadmissible. The costs sellers incur are
gains to buyers; courts should thus excuse only when the satisfaction sellers
lose by enforcement outweighs the satisfaction buyers gain by it. However,
judgments based on relative satisfaction require courts to make moral
comparisons which they are institutionally incompetent to make and require
facts relevant to those comparisons which courts cannot get. Moreover,
neither party, at the time of performance, could predict the outcome of these
interpersonal comparisons were courts to make them. This uncertainty
would cause many sellers affected by unexpected cost increases to breach,
as the cost of breaching would often be lower than the cost of performance.
The second argument, which focuses on "desert," is appealing, for it is
implied by widely acceptable values. However, it seems administratively
unworkable. The uncertainties inherent in its use would make judicial
outcomes unpredictable, thereby again threatening contract stability. The
courts, therefore, have chosen the efficiency case for enforcement over the
equity case for excuse. When the anti-inflationary effect of the decision to
enforce is also put on the scale, that choice seems plainly right. Finally, a
comment to section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, that suggests
that courts should excuse in certain of the circumstances described here,
should not be followed. The section's loose language enables courts to
exclude the unanticipated cause case without being faithless to the text.

